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The European Economic Constitution, Freedom of
Contract and the DCFR
JACOB IEN W. RUTGERS*
Abstract: In the literature on European Contract Law and German contract law, a number
of authors claim that the free movement of goods (Article 28 EC), services (Article 49 EC),
capital (Article 56 EC) and persons (Article 39 EC) guarantee party autonomy and freedom
of contract. In this paper, the opposite will be argued. It is submitted that ‘freedom of con-
tract is taken for granted’ within the European Union. However, it is also generally accept-
ed that there are restraints to freedom of contract to protect societal interests, as for instance
protection of weaker parties, the environment and the capital market. Thus, the real ques-
tion concerns the balance between on the one hand, freedom of contract and, on the other,
restrictions to freedom of contract.
The issue whether freedom of contract is a constitutionally protected right within the Euro-
pean Union is relevant, since if freedom of contract is taken as point of departure ‘… col-
lective interests [are put] to the background’.
In order to show that the free movements do not guarantee freedom of contract, first, the
origin of the claim that the free movements guarantee party autonomy will be explored and
will be placed against a historical background. Then, it will be discussed to what extent the
Treaty provisions reflect the idea that the free movements guarantee freedom of contract
and whether it can be inferred from the ECJ case law.
Résumé : Dans la littérature sur le droit européen des contrats et le droit allemand des con-
trats, un certain nombre d’auteurs clament que la liberté de circulation des marchandises
(article 28 du traité), des services (article 49), des capitaux (article 56) et des personnes (ar-
ticle 39) garantit l’autonomie des parties et la liberté contractuelle. Dans cet article, il sera
soutenu l’inverse. Il semble que la liberté contractuelle soit tenue pour acquise au sein de
l’union européenne. Néanmoins, il est également généralement admis que des limites peu-
vent être posées à la liberté contractuelle pour défendre des intérêts sociétaux, comme par
exemple la protection des parties faibles, l’environnement, ou encore le marché de capitaux.
Ainsi, la question réelle concerne l’équilibre entre, d’une part, la liberté contractuelle et,
d’autre part, les restrictions à cette liberté.
La question de savoir si la liberté contractuelle est un droit constitutionnellement protégé au
sein de l’union européenne est pertinente, dans la mesure où, si la liberté contractuelle est
prise comme point de départ, les intérêts collectifs sont mis à l’arrière-plan.
A fin de montrer que les libertés de mouvement ne garantissent pas la liberté contractuelle,
nous explorerons les origines de cette affirmation selon laquelle les libertés de mouvement
garantiraient l’autonomie des parties, et nous la confronterons notamment aux antécédents
* This paper was presented during the Secola conference in Barcelona (2008). I would like
to thank the participants and Ruth Sefton-Green for their comments on an earlier draft.
The usual disclaimer applies.
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historiques. Nous discuterons ensuite du point de savoir jusqu’à quelle limite les dispositions
du traité reflètent cette idée selon laquelle les libres circulations garantissent la liberté con-
tractuelle et si cette dernière peut être induite de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne de
Justice.
Kurzfassung: In der Literatur über Europäisches und Deutsches Vertragsrecht, geht eine
Zahl von Verfassern davon aus, dass durch freien Güterverkehr (Art. 28 EC), Dienstleis-
tungs- (Art. 49 EC), Kapital- (Art. 56 EC) und Personenverkehrsfreiheit (Art. 39) die Par-
teiautonomie und Vertragsfreiheit garantiert werden. In dieser Abhandlung wird das Ge-
genteilige dargelegt werden. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass innerhalb der Europäischen Union die
,Vertragsfreiheit als selbstverständlich angesehen wird‘. Dennoch ist üblicherweise aner-
kannt, dass Schranken für die Vertragsfreiheit existieren, um soziale Ziele zu schützen,
wie zum Beispiel der Schutz der schwächeren Vertragsparteien, der Schutz der Umwelt
und des Kapitalmarktes. Demnach beschäftigt sich die tatsächliche Frage mit dem Gleich-
gewicht zwischen der Vertragsfreiheit auf der einen Seite und der Beschränkungen der Ver-
tragsfreiheit auf der anderen Seite.
Die Streitfrage ist, ob die Vertragsfreiheit ein durch die Verfassung geschütztes Recht inner-
halb der Europäischen Union ist, da ja, falls die Vertragsfreiheit als ein Abweichungspunkt
interpretiert wird, die ,Interessen der Gemeinschaft in den Hintergrund [gebracht werden]‘.
Um aufzuzeigen, dass der freie Verkehr eine Vertragsfreiheit nicht garantiert, wird zu-
nächst der Ursprung des Autonomieanspruches der Partei, die sich auf den freien Verkehr
beruft, erforscht und gegen den historischen Hintergrund abgegrenzt. Dann wird dargelegt,
inwieweit die Bestimmungen des Übereinkommens die Idee reflektiert, dass die Vertrags-
freiheit den freien Verkehr garantieren kann, und ob sie sich aus dem Präzedenzrecht
ableiten lässt.
I. Introduction
As is well-known the EC-Treaty provides for the free movement of goods
(Article 28), services (Article 49), capital (Article 56) and persons (Article
39). In the literature on European Contract Law and German contract
law, a number of authors claim that the free movements, as laid down in
the Treaty, guarantee party autonomy and freedom of contract.1 In this
1 S. Grundmann, ‘Information, Party Autonomy and Economic Agents in European
Contract Law’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 269, 277 seq; S. Grundmann,
‘The Concept of the Private Law Society: After 50 Years of European and European
Business Law’ (2008) European Review of Private Law 553, at 560 seq; B. Lurger,
Vertragliche Solidarität (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998) 95; B. Lurger,
Grundfragen der Vereinheitlichung des Vertragsrecht in der Europäischen Union (Wien,
New York: Springer, 2002) 277; B. Lurger, ‘The Common Frame of Reference/Op-
tional Code and the Various Understandings of Social Justice in Europe’, in T. Wil-
helmsson / E. Paunio / A. Pohjolainen (eds), Private Law and the Many Cultures of
Europe (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2007) 177, 186; E.-J. Mestmäcker,
Recht und Ökonomisches Gesetz, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1978) 25;
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paper, the opposite will be argued. That is to say: the free movements of
goods, services, capital and persons do not guarantee freedom of contract.
It is submitted that ‘freedom of contract is taken for granted’ within the Eu-
ropean Union.2 However, it is also generally accepted that there are restraints
to freedom of contract in order to protect societal interests, as for instance
protection of weaker parties, the environment and the capital market.
Thus, the real question concerns the balance between on the one hand, free-
dom of contract and, on the other, restrictions to freedom of contract.
The answer to this question will be different, when the point of departure is
the guarantee of freedom of contract. In addition, there also other consequen-
ces. First, the order of discussion will be different; freedom of contract is the
starting point of the debate and restrictions must be justified. In most instan-
ces, restrictions of freedom of contract concern protection of weaker parties
or public policy or other societal interests. For instance, gambling contracts
are not regarded as desirable in society and are consequently illegal.3 In other
words, if the free movements guarantee party autonomy, they ‘put the col-
lective interests to the background’.4
Another implication concerns the division of competences between the
Member States and the European Union. If the free movements guarantee
freedom of contract, it would imply that the Member States are not allowed
to provide legislative measures that restrict freedom of contract, unless they
are justified within the logic of the EC-Treaty. However, I will not deal with
this issue, since I did that elsewhere.
P.O. Mülbert, ‘Privatrecht, die EG-Grundfreiheiten und der Binnenmarkt’ (1995) 159
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht (ZHR) 2, 8; P.-C. Müller-Graff, ‘Basic Free-
doms – Extending Party Autonomy across Borders’, in S. Grundmann / W. Kerber / S.
Weatherill (eds), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market
(Berlin / New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001) 133, 135; O. Remien, Zwingendes
Vertragsrecht und Grundfreiheiten des EG-Vertrages (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003)
178 seq; P. Schlechtriem / M. Schmidt-Kessel, Schuldrecht Allgemeiner Teil (6th ed,
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005) nr 50; R. Schulze, ‘Precontractual Duties and Con-
clusion of Contract in European Law’ (2005) 6 European Review of Private law 841,
845; P. von Wilmowsky, ‘EG Freiheiten und Vertragsrecht’ (1996) JuristenZeitung 590,
593; P. von Wilmowsky, Europäisches Kreditsicherungsrecht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,
1996) 35 seq.
2 Quote taken from N. Jansen / R. Zimmermann, ‘Restating the Acquis communautaire?
A Critical Examination of the “Principles of the Existing EC Contract Law”’ 71 (2008)
The Modern Law Review 505, 518.
3 T. Koopmans, ‘Vrijheden in beweging, voordracht gehouden aan de rijksuniversiteit te
Gent op 5 maart 1976’, in Juridisch stippelwerk (Deventer: Kluwer, 1991) 37, 55.
4 D. Chalmers et al, European Union Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006) 663.
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In order to substantiate my argument, first, the origin of the claim that the
free movements guarantee party autonomy will be explored and will be
placed against a historical background. Then, it will be discussed to what ex-
tent the Treaty provisions reflect the idea that the free movements guarantee
freedom of contract and whether it can be inferred from the ECJ case law.
II. An European Economic Order or Constitution
The idea that the fundamental freedoms guarantee party autonomy originates
from the idea that the EC Treaty constitutes an economic constitution, which
is characterized by the free movements of goods, services, persons and cap-
ital, undistorted competition and the non-discrimination principle.5 The
writings referred to in the introduction are all from German or Austrian au-
thors. This is not surprising, since the concept of the economic constitution,
the Marktwirtschaftsverfassung,6 was developed in Germany as a reaction to
the economic situation in the Weimar Republic and the Nazi-regime and is
part of the ordo-liberal ideas,7 according to which the economic order is prin-
cipally a private law society.8 This implies that freedom of contract prevails in
the market where the transactions take place. According to the ordo-liberal
school of thought, the market must be controlled by the state in a very re-
stricted way. This takes place by means of a constitution which grants eco-
nomic rights to individuals, that cannot by trumped by politically defined
group interests, for instance consumer interests or the interests of small
and medium sized businesses.9 Thus, the constitution protects economic
5 Grundmann (2008), n 1 above, 560; C. Joerges, ‘On the Legitimacy of Europeanising
Private Law: Considerations on a Law of Justi(ce)-fication (Justum Facere) for the EU
Multi-Level System’, in A. Hartkamp et al (eds), Towards a European Civil Code
(Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri/Kluwer Law International, 2004) 159, 161; C. Joerges,
‘What is left of the European Economic Constitution? A melancholic eulogy’ (2005) 30
European Law Review 461, 470; Mestmäcker, n 1 above, 25. Cf M.E. Streit / W.
Mussler, ‘The Economic Constitution of the European Community: From “Rome” to
“Maastricht”’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 5 –30.
6 About the notion of the Marktwirtschaftsverfassung see: F. Rittner, Wirtschaftsrecht
(Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Juristischer Verlag, 1987) 25 seq.
7 D.J. Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition
Law and the New Europea’ (1994) 42 The American Journal of Comparative Law 25,
27; Joerges (2004), n 5 above, 161; C. Joerges / F. Rödl, ‘“Social Market Economy” as
Europe’s Social Model?’, EUI Working Paper Law No. 2004/8, 12 seq; W. Sauter, ‘The
Economic Constitution of the European Union’ (1998) 4 Columbia Journal of Euro-
pean Law 27, 29, 46.
8 Mestmäcker, n 1 above, 29; Rittner, n 6 above, 5 seq.
9 Sauter, n 7 above, 48. Cf Remien, n 1 above, 24 seq.
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rights and freedoms in a way similar to the classical political fundamental
rights and freedoms.10
However, in Germany this theory remained a theory, since it was not adopt-
ed by the German constitutional law world.11 Moreover, political practise
was different as well. The idea of an ordo-liberal economic order was not im-
posed on the Germany economy; it was often lost in the bargaining democ-
racy as Joerges demonstrated.12 Thus, the ordo-liberal theory did not, in fact,
become an economic order in Germany. Instead the social market economy
was created.13 This notion was coined by Müller-Armack and Erhard was its
most important advocate in the political arena.14 Its supporters agreed on the
majority of issues of economic policy with the ordo-liberals. The difference is
that, in addition, the benefits of the market had be distributed equitably in
society.15
The next question is whether the economic order of European Economic
Community (EEC) which was established in 1957, was an ordo-liberal eco-
nomic order or a private law society or, differently put, whether the founding
fathers of the EEC intended to create a private law society. Particularly in
Germany it has been argued that this was the case. The most important au-
thors in this respect are von der Groeben, Mestmäcker.16 These authors con-
sider the EEC an ordo-liberal enterprise, since in their view market-mecha-
nism is the main instrument to establish the common market.17 Further, the
free movements are one of the instruments to guarantee individual economic
freedom by setting aside its restrictions, as well as the non-discrimination
principle.18 State interventions were further restricted by rules on state aid
and abuse of private economic power was prevented by the rules on compe-
10 Sauter, n 7 above, 48. Cf Gerber, n 7 above, 36 seq, 42; Lurger (2002), n 1 above, 225.
11 Joerges (2004), n 5 above, 161; Joerges (2005), n 5 above, 468; Joerges / Rödl, n 7 above,
5; Sauter, n 7 above, 48, 49.
12 Joerges (2005), n 5 above, 469.
13 About the social market economy see: C. Watrin, ‘Germany’s Social Market Econo-
my’, in A. Kilmarnock (ed), The Social Market and the State (London: the Social
Market Foundation, 1999) 89. Cf M. Mazover, Dark Continent, Europe’s twentieth
century (New York: Vintage Books, 1998) 297.
14 Gerber, n 7 above, 32, 60 seq; Joerges / Rödl, n 7 above, 14.
15 Gerber, n 7 above, 32; Joerges / Rödl, n 7 above, 14 seq; Remien, n 1 above, 24 seq.
16 Joerges (2005), n 5 above, 471; Sauter, n 7 above, 49 n 77; B. Lurger, ‘The Future of
European Contract Law between Freedom of Contract, Social Justice, and Market
Rationality’ (2005) 1 European Review of Contract Law 442, 452.
17 Sauter, n 7 above. See also Streit / Mussler, n 5 above, 14 seq. Cf Joerges (2005), n 5
above, 470 seq.
18 Sauter, n 7 above, 50.
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tition law.19 Other issues, such as agricultural policy were considered to be
just mistakes.20
In the next section it will be explored whether the founding Member States
really had the intention to create an ordo-liberal economic order within the
EEC.
III. A Historical Perspective
At the moment of the EEC’s creation in 1957, the picture of its economic
order was not as clear as it is perceived by certain authors nowadays.21 To
begin with, in 1957, the six founding Member States, Germany, France,
Italy and the Benelux Countries had different economic orders. France
and Italy favoured a more interventionist approach to the economy, whereas
in Germany the emphasis was on the market economy.22 The Benelux coun-
tries held a position somewhere in between.23 Secondly, there were political
differences of opinion concerning the EEC in each Member State.24 In the
German government there were strong differences of opinion between the
Prime Minister Adenauer, on the one hand, and Erhard, the minister for eco-
nomic affairs, on the other, who was a strong advocate of free trade and very
sceptical about the EEC.25 He favoured a looser free trade association.26
19 Sauter, n 7 above, 49.
20 Joerges (2005), n 5 above, 470; Sauter, n 7 above, 51.
21 See in this respect: H.J. Küsters, ‘Jean Monnet and the European Union: Idea and
Reality of the Integration Process’, in G. Majone et al (eds), Jean Monnet et l’Europe
d’aujourd’hui (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1989) 45. See with respect to
the Schuman Plan: W. von Simson, ‘Reflections on Jean Monnet’s Skilfull Handling of
Member States and People during the First Years of the Community’, in Majone et al
(eds), this note above, 29.
22 Küsters, n 21 above, 53; Sauter, n 7 above, 49; P. VerLoren van Themaat, ‘Die Auf-
gabenverteilung zwischen dem Gesetzgeber und dem Europäischen Gerichtshof bei
der Gestaltung der Wirtschaftsverfassung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften’, in E.-J.
Mestmäcker / H. Möller / H.-P. Schwarz (eds), Eine Ordnungspolitik für Europa,
Festschrift für Hans von der Groeben (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987)
425, 426.
23 Sauter, n 7 above.
24 For disagreement in the Dutch government about the European integration between
the prime minister and others: J. van Merrienboer, Mansholt (Amsterdam: Boom,
2006) 187, 221.
25 T. Judt, Postwar, A History of Europe Since 1945 (London: The Penguin Press, 2005)
304; see also De Europese dagboeken van Max Kohnstamm, Augustus 1953 – Sep-
tember 1957, bezorgd door M. Segers (Amsterdam: Boom, 2008) 121, 123, 196 seq.
26 Judt, n 25 above, 305.
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Then, at the time, the EEC was seen as a first step towards a political and
defence Community.27 Consequently, many issues were not provided for
in the 1957 Treaty.28 For instance, Koopmans, a former ECJ Judge, writes
that the Treaty did not provide any rules concerning the substance of the
legal order. It was up to the ECJ to reveal this order, since this was missing
in the Treaty.29
To sum up, these accounts do not justify the conclusion that the founding
Member States intended the economic order of the European Economic
Community to be an ordo-liberal one nor that the free movements guarantee
freedom of contract consequently.
IV. The Treaties
Often the EC-Treaty and the 1957 Treaty establishing the EEC are presented
as the documents which include an ordo-liberal economic order. Hereafter, it
will be discussed to what extent it follows from the Treaties and its provisions
that they include such an economic order.
Already from the 1960 s onwards, there has been a discussion concerning the
EEC’s underlying economic order. A group of Benelux authors, and also the
Italian Pescatore, come to the conclusion that the economic order is a mixed
one, which they inter alia base on the 1957 Treaty provisions.30 For instance,
former ECJ Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat infers this from Arti-
cles 2 and 3 of the 1957 EEC-Treaty, that provide the EEC’s tools and aims,
which are, amongst other things, the creation and good functioning of the
internal market, which is characterized by both unfettered competition on
the one hand and intervention in the economy by regulation on the other
hand.31 Principles such as equality and solidarity and agricultural policy
were seen as the expression of the interventionist side of the EEC. In addition
Article 225 (now Article 295 EC) played an important role in that respect.
According to that provision, it is a matter of the Member States to regulate
their systems of property law. This rule was introduced so that France and
27 T. Koopmans, ‘The Birth of European Law at the CrossRoads of Legal Traditions’
(1991) 39 The American Journal of Comparative Law 493. Cf Judt, n 25 above, 302.
28 Koopmans, n 27 above, 493.
29 Koopmans, n 27 above, 495; Cf Judt, n 25 above, 302.
30 Cf Sauter, n 7 above, 49; P. VerLoren van Themaat, ‘Het econonomisch grondsla-
genrecht van de Europese Gemeenschappen’, in Liber Amicorum Josse Wildemars
Mertens (Antwerpen: Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen / Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink,
1982) 355, 363 seq; VerLoren van Themaat, n 22 above, 425– 443.
31 VerLoren van Themaat, n 30 above, 363 seq.
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Italy could not be forced to denationalize their industries.32 In other words,
nationalization of industry was possible.
As is well-known, the 1957 Treaty was modified many times, for instance by
the Single European Act of 1987, The Treaty on the European Union (also
known as the Treaty of Maastricht of 1993), the Treaty of Amsterdam in
1997, the Treaty of Nice. Those changes are considered by for instance Saut-
er, Joerges and Streit and Mussler to assess whether the ordo-liberal econom-
ic order is the basis of the Community’s economic order.33 They all come to
the conclusion that this is not the case. For instance, the Single European Act
introduced Article 100a, (now Article 95 EC) which provided for the adop-
tion of legislative measures by a qualified majority in the Council.34 More-
over Article 100b (now Article 95(3) EC) includes a high level of consumer,
health and safety, and environmental protection. The former provided for
more intervention in the economy and the latter provides for protection of
collective interests.35 In the Treaty of Maastricht, the principle of subsidiarity
is introduced, which in the view of the ordo-liberals undermines Community
competences.36 Further, in the Treaty of Amsterdam, social and employment
policies were moved to the core of the Treaty.37
From the above, it can be inferred that on the basis of the provisions of the
different Treaties it cannot be concluded that the ordo-liberal economic
order is the basis of the European economic order. Consequently, it cannot
be deduced from the Treaties that the European Community is a private law
society nor that the fundamental freedoms guarantee freedom of contract.
The next matter to be considered is whether it can be inferred from the
ECJ case law that the free movements guarantee party autonomy.
V. The ECJ Case Law
First, a few general remarks will be made concerning the case law with re-
spect to the fundamental freedoms in order to answer the question whether
it follows from the ECJ’s case law that the free movements guarantee free-
dom of contract. As stated before, the free movement of goods, services, per-
sons and capital are enshrined in the EC Treaty and these provisions are ad-
32 Sauter, n 7 above; VerLoren van Themaat, n 30 above, 365 seq.
33 Sauter, n 7 above, 51 seq. Cf Gerber, n 7 above, 75 seq.
34 Sauter, n 7 above, 52, 53; Streit / Mussler, n 5 above, 19 seq.
35 Joerges (2005), n 5 above, 474; Streit / Mussler, n 5 above, 19 seq.
36 Sauter, n 7 above, 55. Cf Streit / Mussler, n 5 above, 21 seq; it is submitted that they
focus on other aspects of the Maastricht Treaty.
37 Sauter, n 7 above, 56.
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dressed to the Member States. In the context of this paper only the vertical
effect of the free movements is relevant.
The aim of the free movements is to open up national markets, so that a com-
mon market or internal market will be established.38 In order to do so, all na-
tional measures that are an obstacle to trade must be set aside, unless they
pass the justification test.39 The first landmark case in this respect is Dasson-
ville, pursuant to which all national rules ‘which are capable of hindering di-
rectly or indirectly, potentially or actually intra-Community trade’ cannot be
applied, provided that they are not justified on the basis of the grounds which
are included in the EC-Treaty.40 As a result, national rules that either openly
or covertly discriminate between national and imported products are consid-
ered to be an obstacle to trade between the Member States.41
In Cassis de Dijon, the category of rules that obstruct trade, was enlarged to
measures that do not discriminate either covertly or openly.42 In the absence
of harmonization, disparity of national legislation resulted in an infringement
of the free movement of goods, provided that the national legislation had not
been justified. However, to counteract the enlargement of rules that could be
set aside, the ECJ also created a new non-exhaustive category of justification
grounds. As a consequence of Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ was flooded with
cases in which rules that did not concern cross-border trade, were challenged,
since they allegedly were an obstacle to inter-Community trade.
To reverse this development, the ECJ rendered its decision in Keck and
ACHTUNGTRENNUNGMithouard, in which the Court discerned between selling arrangements
and product requirements.43 Rules concerning the former concern the time
and place of a sale, whereas rules concerning the latter involve issues such
as the quality of products and quantity of ingredients in products. This dis-
tinction was aimed at clarifying the existing case law at the time. It is the
question whether the ECJ managed to do so, since many national courts
38 See the opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in case 158/04 and 159/04 Alfa
Vita Vassilopoulos AE v Elliniko Dimosio, Nomarkhiaki Aftodiikisi Ioanninon, and
Carrefour-Marinopoulos AE v Elliniko Dimosio, Nomarkhiaki Aftodiikisi Ioanninon
[2006] ECR I-8135 (ECJ).
39 S. Weatherill, ‘Recent Developments in the law governing the free movements of goods
in the EC’s internal market’ (2006) 2 European Review of Contract Law 90, 91.
40 Case 8/74 Procureur de Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 (ECJ).
41 C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, The Four Freedoms (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007) 97; P. Craig / G. de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 669 seq.
42 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649 (ECJ). Cf Craig / de Búrca, n 41 above,
677 seq.
43 Case 268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097 (ECJ). Craig / de Búrca, n 41
above, 685.
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asked preliminary questions concerning this distinction, since it has been
rather difficult to apply in practise.44
Also within the literature, the Keck test has met considerable criticism.45 One
of the criticisms is that often a national rule does not fit easily into either of
these categories. Roth refers to rules of private law in this respect and argues
that they do not fall in either category; the access to market test should be
applied instead.46 Criticism has also come from the Court’s Advocate Gen-
erals.47 Different Advocate Generals proposed alternative tests.48 For in-
stance, in his opinion in Alfa Vita, Advocate General Poiares Maduro, sug-
gests a uniform approach for the four movements, which he bases on an anal-
ysis of the post-Keck case law.49 His starting point is that the aim of the free
movements is to open up national markets, rather than an absolute right to
economic or commercial freedom. A side effect may be the liberalisation of
national economies. Thus, from the general case law with respect to the free
movements it cannot be inferred that they guarantee freedom of contract.
Rather it could be argued that on the basis of the case law their aim is to
open up markets. The next issue which arises, is whether this also can be con-
cluded on the basis of cases in which the ECJ had to deal with contract law in
particular.
There are not that many cases in which the ECJ had to address whether na-
tional rules of contract law are contrary to the free movements. The most
well-known cases are Alsthom Atlantique50 and CMC Motorradcenter.51 In
Alsthom Atlantique the preliminary question concerned the French rule on
hidden defects (Article 1643 of the French Civil Code), according to
which the manufacturer is liable for hidden defects even he is not aware of
44 See the opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in: Cases 158/04 and 159/04, n
38 above.
45 S. Weatherill, ‘Some Thoughts on how to Clarify the Clarification’ (1996) 33 Common
Market Law Review 885– 906. See for an overview of the criticism: Craig / de Búrca, n
41 above, 692 seq; cf Chalmers et al, n 4 above, 686.
46 P. Oliver / W.-H. Roth, ‘The Internal Market and the Four Freedoms’ (2004) 41
Common Market Law Review 407, 414.
47 See the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in: Case 412/93 Société d’Importation
Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v TF 1 Publicité SA and M6 Publicité SA [1995] ECR I-179
(ECJ), para 41 of the opinion.
48 See for instance: Advocate General Jacobs in Case 412/93, n 47 above; Advocate
General Geelhoed in Case 239– 02 Douwe Egberts NV v Westrom Pharma NV and
others, ECJ 15 July 2004.
49 Case 158/04 and 159/04, n 38 above.
50 Case 339/89 Alsthom Altantique v Compagnie de construction mécanique Sulzer SA
[1991] ECR I-107 (ECJ).
51 Case 93/92 CMC Motorradcenter GmbH v P. Baskiciogullari [1993] ECR I-5009
(ECJ).
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them, unless it is stipulated in the contract that he is not.52 According to
French case law, there is an irrebutable presumption that the seller is
aware of any hidden defects in the sold goods, unless the contract is conclud-
ed with a party that operates in the same branch. The Court had to answer
whether this rule developed by the French courts was contrary to the free
movement of exported goods (now Article 29 EC) in a dispute between
two French parties before a French court. The ECJ came to the conclusion
that it did not, since the French rule applied without any distinction to all
relationships governed by that rule. Moreover, it did not have as its aim
the regulation of export nor favouring domestic products or the domestic
market.
In CMC-Motorradcenter, a lady who lived in Germany had ordered a
ACHTUNGTRENNUNGYamaha moped in Germany from a German dealer, who was not an official
ACHTUNGTRENNUNGYamaha dealer.53 Part of the contract was a guarantee that all official Yahama
dealers would repair her moped when something went wrong. However, in
Germany they did not, in fact, do so when the moped had been obtained
from a non-official dealer. Her seller had omitted to inform her of that prac-
tise. She refused to take the moped and the seller sued her for damages. The
preliminary question posed to the ECJ was whether the German rule of culpa
in contrahendo, which required the seller to inform the buyer of the official
Yahama dealers’ practise not to repair mopeds bought from non-official deal-
ers, was contrary to the free movements. The ECJ held that the German rule
of contract law applied without any distinction to all relationships governed
by German law. Moreover, the aim of the rules is not to regulate trade. Then,
it drew the conclusion that the alleged restrictive effect was too uncertain and
too indirect to constitute a hindrance to trade.
A similarity between these two cases is that a mandatory rule of national con-
tract law was challenged in both instances. Moreover, the ECJ held that these
rules did not obstruct trade between the Member States and consequently
were not contrary to the free movements. When these two rulings are con-
sidered in the light of the question whether the free movements guarantee
freedom of contract, the answer is negative. First, the Court does not consid-
er a rule of mandatory contract law contrary to the free movements. From
this, it cannot be inferred that the free movements guarantee freedom of con-
tract, it is rather the opposite. Moreover, it implies that in purely national
situations, it belongs to the realm of the Member States to provide rules of
contract law.
52 See also: Remien, n 1 above, 182.
53 See also: Remien, n 1 above, 182.
Freedom of Contract and the DCFRERCL 2/2009 105
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
However, when Omega Spielhallen54 is taken into account, one could argue
that the free movements guarantee freedom of contract. It is submitted that
this case started off as an administrative law case and this decision is well-
known, since fundamental human rights were at stake. However, it may
also shed some light on the relation between freedom of contract and the
free movement of services. Omega Spielhallen, a German company, had con-
cluded a contract with an English company for the supply of gear in order to
run a laser game business, in which people could pretend to kill each other
with laser pistols, in Bonn (Germany). In England the game was allowed,
however, the Bonn police authorities forbid it, since it was against public pol-
icy and in particular in conflict with human dignity, a fundamental right that
is protected by Article 1(1) of the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law). The
issue which the European Court of Justice had to tackle was whether the
game’s prohibition was contrary to the free movement of services, since
the equipment was provided by an English company which had entered
into a contract with Omega Spielhallen. The ECJ held that even if there
had not been a franchise or a supply contract at the moment the order of pro-
hibition was issued, it is clear that this order ‘is capable of restricting the fu-
ture development of contractual relations between the two parties.’55 How-
ever, the ECJ held that the right of human dignity was a justification which
could trump the free movement of services even though the game was per-
mitted in England.
A similar situation occurred in Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v Avides
Media.56 Avides Media, a company incorporated under German law, had im-
ported Japanese cartoons, called Animes, in DVD or Video cassette format
from the UK, where it was categorised by the British Board of Film Classi-
fication as ‘suitable only for 15 years and over’. Avides sold them in Germany
by mail order via the internet and an electronic trading platform. In Germany
the cartoons were not examined in accordance with German law in particular
the Jugendschutzgesetz (Law on the protection of young persons). A compet-
itor of Avides, Dynamic Medien, also a company incorporated under Ger-
man law, started interim proceedings against Avides and asked the court
for an order to stop the sale by mail order, since it was not in compliance
with the German law concerning the protection of young persons. The Ger-
man courts in first instance and in appeal granted this order. In the proceed-
ings on merits, the Landgericht Koblenz asked preliminary questions, inter
54 Case 36/02 Omega Spielhalle- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürger-
meisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609 (ECJ). Note by T. Ackermann,
(2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 1107 –1120.
55 Case 36/02, n 54 above, para 21.
56 Case 244/06 Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v Avides Media AG, ECJ 14 February
2008 (nyr) (ECJ).
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alia whether the German law on the protection of younger persons was not
contrary to the free movement of goods. The ECJ, first, held that the facts of
this case did not fall within the scope of Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic
commerce,57 since ‘Article 2(h)(ii) does not govern the requirements applica-
ble to goods as such.’ Consequently, the rules of German law had to be con-
sidered in the light of the Articles 28 and 30 EC. It had, inter alia, to be es-
tablished whether the rule of German law was a selling arrangement within
the meaning of Keck and therefore fell outside the scope of the free move-
ment of goods. After repeating the Dassonville–formula and a lengthy discus-
sion of the distinction between product requirements and selling arrange-
ments, the Court came to the conclusion that the German law at stake
does not fall within the category of selling arrangements within the meaning
of Keck, since ‘Such rules are liable to make the importation of image storage
media from a Member State other than … Germany more difficult and more
expensive, with the result that they may dissuade some interested parties
from marketing such image storage media in the latter Member State.’58
The ECJ also confirmed that the protection of the child is a legitimate interest
to allow an infringement of the free movement of goods. Omega Spielhallen
en Avides Media can be explained in the light of the principle of mutual rec-
ognition as developed in Cassis de Dijon. When a good or a service is lawfully
produced in one Member State, it must be able to travel freely to another
Member State. That was what at stake in these two cases. In both cases
the German market was closed due to German measures. Since as explained
above, the aim of the free movements is to open up markets, it follows that
these measures obstruct trade between the Member States and must be, con-
sequently, set aside.
In short, from the ECJ case law concerning it does not follow that the free
movements guarantee freedom of contract. Their aim is rather to open up na-
tional markets.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper it was argued that the free movements as included in the EC-
Treaty do not guarantee freedom of contract as is often claimed by, in par-
ticular, German and Austrian authors. It was, first, argued on the basis of his-
torical facts that neither the founding fathers of the European Economic
Community nor the 1957 Treaty on the European Economic Community
57 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic com-
merce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), OJEC 2000 L 178/1.
58 Case 244/06, n 56 above, consideration 31.
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was intended to create an ordo-liberal economic order. Subsequently, very
briefly the changes to the 1957 Treaty were discussed to demonstrate that
also the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaty do not purport to an
ordo-liberal economic order. Finally, it was also concluded that this claim
does not follow from the ECJ case law. This all results in the conclusion
that the European economic constitution does not require freedom of con-
tract as an absolute starting point for future legislative measures of the Euro-
pean Union in the area of contract law, rather it allows for a balance between
freedom of contract on the one hand and other societal or welfare interests on
the other.
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